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Foreclosure of Securitized Commercial Mortgages
- A Model of the Special Servicer
Abstract
The decision to foreclose on a CMBS mortgage is made by the special servicer. A loan is in
special servicing when the mortgage is either delinquent or in a state of imminent default. The
special servicer should represent the interests of the underlying CMBS bondholders by getting
the most dollars back for the investors. In this paper, we show that the special servicer's com-
pensation structure results in an incentive for him to extend the loan beyond the time desired
by the bondholders. We develop a model of these conicting incentives and demonstrate how
compensation incentives interact and inuence the special servicer's foreclosure decision. Our
model takes into consideration the dynamic nature of this decision by viewing the foreclosure
decision as a dynamic programming problem whereby foreclosure represents a discrete terminal
state of an optimal stopping problem. This model thus captures the trade-o between continu-
ation of the loan with its termination and we use this model to determine how the stopping rule
changes under various compensation structures.
Keywords: CMBS, Special Servicer, Foreclosure, First-loss Bond.
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1. Introduction
Following the recent collapse of the subprime mortgage market, there is widespread concern that
the next wave of mortgage defaults will occur in the Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
(CMBS) sector. With lax underwriting being the primary cause behind the high levels of
subprime mortgage defaults, a similar claim can be made about commercial mortgages originated
at the same time. Some practices include underwriting loans based on optimistic projections
of future property cash ow as opposed to past practice of using her typical cash ows. This
has led to the so-called \proforma loans." Furthermore, many of these loans were interest-only
thus precluding the borrower from accumulating equity through amortization. These loans often
have a short term balloon provision whereby balloon maturities were reduced dramatically, often
within several years from origination. These eects, taken together, may explain the steady
increase in the rate of loan delinquencies we're observing today.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 1 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
With the shortened balloon maturity dates of recent issuances, combined with tighter credit
markets, the inability of borrowers to renance may also lead to defaults. Figure 1 plots the
maturing balances of CMBS loans broken down by year of origination. We see that within the
next two years, there will be approximately $35 Billion and $39 Billion of loans due respectively.
In 2012, there will be an additional $50 Billion of loans due. If the present tight lending
environment continues over the next three years, we may see a sizable number of such maturity
defaults. Figure 2 shows that the CMBS loans that transferred into special servicers have been
increasing since 2007. According to Trepp, as of July 31, 2010, the total distressed CMBS loans
that are currently under special servicing have reached to 12:73%:
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 2 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
While gure 1 indicates a potential looming problem, it is important to note that the actual
foreclosure decision in CMBS loans are made by an entity called the special servicer. The special
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servicer has considerable discretion in how she manages a distressed mortgage. Her actions can
range from making advances for any debt service shortfalls to traditional loan workout strategies
such as loan write-downs or loan modications. Since the special servicer is compensated by a
periodic fee along with other revenue sources for the period she is actively managing the loan,
the actual foreclosure decision represents a terminal state for her compensation. This indicates
that such a decision will likely involve a trade-o between retaining the compensation stream
and the benets associated from mortgage termination.
The ability to postpone the foreclosure date, sometimes by as much as two years, suggest
that whether the future wave of anticipated foreclosures will occur will depend on the actions
of the special servicer. Given the conict between receiving income streams from postponing
foreclosure and serving the needs of all bondholder, understanding this trade-o is an important
precursor to assessing the potential severity of the CMBS loan defaults. Thus the analysis of
the potential CMBS default problem hinges on understanding how the special service makes her
foreclosure decision and how this decision is inuenced by the various incentives that result from
her various sources of compensation.
These relationships are further complicated by the fact that most special servicers retain the
rst loss bonds from the CMBS structure with loans that they are managing. Furthermore, the
special servicers usually have the right of rst refusal to purchase defaulted loans at market-value
prices, which are determined by the special servicers. Gan and Mayer 2007 report that among
the CMBS deals that the special servicers manage, 64% of them contain some portion of rst-
loss bonds held by special servicers. Holding the rst loss security makes them essentially an
equity investor thus their foreclosure decision may better align with the below investment grade
CMBS bondholders rather than the senior bondholders. Senior bondholders in general prefer
that the property is sold quickly since they are the rst to receive any liquidation proceeds.
In contrast, the below investment grade bond investors wish to postpone liquidation since any
principal losses will immediately impact their bonds. With the special servicer holding the
riskiest of the below investment grade bonds, this may skew her decision to postpone foreclosure
at the expense of the senior bondholders.
In this paper, we provide a model of the special servicer and outline how these varying
compensation structures inuence her foreclosure decision. Our model captures the dynamic
nature of this decision whereby the special servicer must continuously evaluate the trade-o
between keeping loan alive with advances and extension provisions and foreclosing on the loan
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in an environment of changing and uncertain future market conditions. While there have been
numerous empirical studies which have estimated the factors leading to CMBS loan default,
there has been fewer studies which have modeled the actual foreclosure decision1.
2. Loans in Special Servicing
As of the end of July, 2010, there are more than $89:14 billion of loans, or 12:70% of all conduit
loans by balance, residing in special servicing. There are 16 companies who serve as special
servicers with the largest special servicer, LNR Partners, managing 1; 297 loans valued at more
than $23 Billion. Table 1 contains information on the numbers and size of loans managed by
each of the special servicers.
Table 1: CMBS Loans in Special Servicing by Servicers
Special Servicer # of Loans Balance of Loans ($Mil.)
LNR Partners, Inc. 1; 297 23; 021
CW Capital Asset Management 952 18; 082
C-III Asset Management LLC 621 8; 688
Midland 507 8; 455
JE Roberts 310 5; 119
Helios AMC, LLC 190 3; 611
Berkadia 296 1; 978
ING Clarion Partners, LLC 127 1; 942
Orix 94 762
NCB,FSB 10 172
GMAC 23 64
Prudential 2 50
Wells Fargo 7 30
GE Capital 3 15
Lend Lease 7 11
KeyBank 1 5
1For empirical default studies, see Ambrose and Sanders (2003), Ciochetti, Deng, Gao and Yao (2002),
Chen and Deng (2004), Vandell, et. al. (1993) and Lebret and Quan (2008). For models on special
servicers, see Ambrose, Yavas and Sanders (2008) and Gan and Mayer (2007).
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Source: JP Morgan CMBS Research, July 31, 2010
To get a sense of the characteristics of the loans in special servicing, Table 2 provides the
number of loans and the percentage of the total loan balance by loan vintage. We see that
63:3% of loans held by special servicers were those originate in 2006 and 2007. This is consistent
with the belief that underwriting quality for these loans were poor during this period, the same
period where similar lax standards were used to originate subprime mortgages.
Table 2: CMBS Loans in Special Servicing by Vintage
Deal Vintage # of Loans Balance % by Balance
1996 9 37; 706; 362 0:1%
1997 23 46; 005; 334 0:1%
1998 104 709; 210; 049 1:0%
1999 202 1; 128; 937; 428 1:6%
2000 318 1; 818; 975; 972 2:5%
2001 241 1; 713; 806; 823 2:4%
2002 140 1; 055; 250; 749 1:5%
2003 192 2; 097; 692; 569 2:9%
2004 339 3; 948; 833; 692 5:5%
2005 734 12; 715; 579; 768 17:7%
2006 1; 010 16; 342; 122; 550 22:7%
2007 1; 056 29; 200; 468; 697 40:6%
2008 79 1; 190; 019; 545 1:7%
Data as of July 31, 2010. Source: JP Morgan, CMBS Research
Table 3 categorizes the distressed mortgages under special servicing into groups according
to their collateral property types. It shows that the biggest sector that has distressed loans is
lodging (22%), followed by apartment sector (15.7%). This is not surprising as the revenues
generated from hotels and motels (as well as apartments) are most risky due to the lack of
long-term leases.
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Table 3: CMBS Loans in Special Servicing by Property Types
Portion of Balance Share of Special
Property Type Balance ($Mil.) in Special Servicing Servicing by Balance
Retail 18; 621:8 9:1% 21:0%
Multifamily 18; 358:8 17:8% 20:6%
Oce 21; 744:1 10:4% 24:6%
Industrial 2; 295:3 6:7% 2:6%
Lodging 17; 074:7 24:2% 19:3%
Other 11; 045:5 14:1% 12:5%
Total/Average 89; 140:2 Average 11:3% 100%
Data as of July 31, 2010. Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert, August 6, 2010
2.1. Special Servicers' Decisions
When loans are delinquent in their payments or deemed in a state of imminent default, the
master servicer transfers the mortgage to the special servicer who is responsible for managing
and possibly modifying the troubled loan. Once the loan is in the hands of the special servicer,
there are numerous actions she can take:
 Maturity Date Extensions - Although loan extensions were quite rare prior to 2008, re-
cent turmoil in the credit markets have resulted in many borrowers unable to renance
their mortgages to meet looming loan payments. Typical extensions range from 12 to 36
months, depending on the special servicer's assessment of the property's income generating
potential and the credit worthiness of the borrower.
 Payment Modication - If there is insucient property income to meet the schedule debt
service, the special servicer may reduce the payments for a dened period. This is a fairly
popular type of restructuring.
 Reduction in Interest Rates - Similar to the payment modication, the loan rate may
be reduced if such a reduction can lead to payments which are manageable given the
property's income.
 Reduction in Principal Balance - This is the costliest to the special servicer who hold
the rst loss bond from the CMBS structure. This is used only when the other payment
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reduction strategies does not work. In some cases, the borrower will have to contribute
additional funds to oset the principal reduction.
 Discounted Payos - This is used if the borrower has to ability to pay o the loan at the
discounted value and it is not anticipated that property values will increase in the near
future. This may have tax implications since such discounts may be viewed as discharge
of debt. A more tax ecient approach would be for the borrower to purchase the note at
the discounted value.
 Short Sales - This occurs when there is a potential buyer who is willing to purchase at
a reduced price for the note. The loan is written down to a level acceptable to the new
buyer who assumes the loan upon sale.
 Additional Capital Injection - The special servicer may require the borrower to contribute
additional capital to avoid foreclosure.
 A/B Split Note - The loan is split into two notes, with the A note equalling the amount
of the loan that can be supported by the current property income. The B note is the
dierence between the loan amount and the size of the A note. This note is due at the
time of maturity thus there is a possibility that it may be paid.
2.2. Special Servicer's Compensation
Compensation structure of various participants in a CMBS deal is an important part of the
Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA). Although the special servicer's role is to represent
the interests of all CMBS bondholders, her sources of compensation may lead her to adopt
foreclosure rules which conict with the bondholders' interest. Special servicers are typically paid
a xed fee of 2 basis points of the balance for each month they are managing the troubled loan.
Furthermore, originally proposed as a mechanism to ensure the special servicer would minimize
losses from managing the loans, they often hold the rst loss bonds from the CMBS structure
which contains the loan under special servicing. The rationale being that any premature losses
from poor loan management will directly result in losses incurred from holding the rst loss
bonds. If the loan returns to being a performing loan and is returned back to the master servicer,
the special servicer will be rewarded 1% of the loan balance. The special servicer is also paid 1%
of the proceeds from liquidation. In addition, the special servicer is paid a percentage of funds
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she is able to extract from the borrower. The special servicer should also have the ability to
make advances to the bondholders if there is a shortfall in debt service payments. This advance
is recovered from either the proceeds from a sale or from the borrower if the loan is cured and
becomes current. These advances have the rst priority to be reimbursed before even the most
senior bond holders get paid.
3. The Model
Using models developed by Rust (1987), the special servicer's optimal servicing decision is mod-
eled as a dynamic programming problem. These models capture the regenerative intertemporal
trade-o decision faced by the servicer. At each point in time, she determines the value of
continuing to service the loan and being compensated versus the decision to foreclose on the
property. The regenerative nature of her decision reects the fact that postponing will allow
him to make the same decision the next period. What changes each period is the income gener-
ating capabilities of the property which we take to be a stochastic process. The solution to this
problem which is captured by the Bellman equations yields a cut-o point of property income
which determines her default decision.
Every month, the special servicer makes a decision of either to foreclose or continue to the
next month. Foreclosing a loan terminates the option of working out the loan in next period. If
the special servicer chooses to continue, it can conduct one or more workout strategies to modify
the loan as previously outlined. The special servicer keeps the option to foreclose the loan in
next or future periods if the loan continues to underperform. Figure 3 illustrates the special
servicer's decision process.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 3 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
The special servicer's optimal decision can be summarized as the critical cut-o level of a
property's Net Operating Income (NOI) whereby she forecloses if the property's NOI is above
this threshold level. We are interested in how this critical value diers if she holds a rst loss
bond. These decision rules discussed above are dierent for each loan and change over time
according to market conditions and property characteristics.
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Assume the borrower's NOI follows a rst-order autoregressive AR(1) process:
NOIt+1 = + NOIt + et (3.1)
where  is a constant mean;  2 (0; 1) is autoregressive parameter; et is the error term, which
follows a standard normal distribution with constant variance 2. Let the initial stabilized net
operation income at loan origination be NOI0, and the going-in capitalization rate be Cap0.
The lender's underwriting criteria can be summarized by two variables: maximum loan-to-value
ratio (LTV0) and the minimum debt service coverage ratio (DSCR0). The CMBS deal contains
two innitely-lived tranches2: a senior tranche and a subordination tranche (rst-loss bond) with
the same coupon rate R0
3. Assuming the CMBS loan was issued at the binding constraints, the
maximum loan amount at origination is determined by the periodic stabilized NOI that the
underlying property generates. The advantage of this assumption is to make the commercial
mortgage scalable, that is the loan amount is a constant multiple of stabilized NOI at origination.
L = NOI0 where  = min

LTV0
Cap0
;
1
DSCR0 R0

(3.2)
The optimal stopping rule is the solution to a stochastic dynamic programming problem
that formalizes the trade-o between the conicting objectives of maximizing special servicer's
income for continuation of workout versus maximizing the liquidation value of the property.
The idea is to explain the joint stochastic processes fi;Xtg ; where fitg is a set of binary-valued
process: it = 1 if special servicer forecloses the property, and 0 otherwise. fXtg is a vector
of state variables observed by both the special servicer and us, the model builder. We choose
the cumulative advances as the state variable Xt in our model. The cumulative advances,
which is dened as total advances the servicer makes since the servicing transfer event, are
determined by many factors such as macroeconomic conditions, loan performance history, loan
terms and collateral information. The vector f"tg represent the latent variables observed only
by the servicer but not us4. The maintained hypothesis is that the special servicing follows an
2We later relax this assumption by assuming the holdings of the rst-loss pieces decrease over time.
3Normally the coupon rate of a subordination bond is higher than that of senior tranche. However,
making the interest rates of the two tranches the same does not aect the main result.
4The error term can be interpreted as special servicer's heterogeneity. For example, if a special servicer
chooses to hedge their rst-loss holdings by entering into swap contracts, her workout strategy will be
dierent from those who have market exposure to rst-bond price risks. For discussion about dierent
interpretation and model techniques of the error terms, please see Rust 1992.
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intertemporal optimal strategy.
It can be shown that the stochastic process governing fXt; "tg is the solution to the following
value function:
V (Xt; "t) = sup

E
8<:
1X
j=1
(j t) [u (xj ; fj ; 1) + "j (fj)] jxt;"t; 2; 3
9=; (3.3)
where the servicer chooses a sequence of decision rules ft (xt; "t; ) to maximize her expected
discounted utility function over an innite horizon,  = fft; ft+1; ft+2; :::g ;with  being her
intertemporal rate of time preference.
The optimal value function V is the unique solution to following Bellman's equation:
V (xt; "t) = max
i2C(xt)
[u (xt; i; 1) + "t (i) + EV (xt; "t; i)] (3.4)
The realized single-period utility of decision i when state variable is (xt; "t) can be written
as:
u (xt; i; 1) + "i (i)
=
 s1L+ bLR0 Zt+"t (0) ; it= 0 continue
s2Vt+
tP
j=1
Zj (1 +R1)
t j + max (0; Vt   (1  b)L) Y (Xt) +"t (1) ; it= 1 foreclose
(3.5)
Each month, the servicer faces a discrete decision of whether continue to monitor and modify
the loan or to foreclose the property. If the she chooses to continue, it receives a constant
monthly servicing fee of s1:He makes an advance if the realized NOI is smaller than scheduled
monthly payment. The periodic advance including principal and interest payable to bond holder
in addition to servicing advances is dened as the incremental changes in the observed state
variable fXg ; Zt = Xt  Xt 1.
In addition to servicing income and expenses, the servicer receives payment from holding the
subordination or rst loss bond. The servicer receives an interest income bLR0 where b is the
proportion of all subordination bonds that she holds. When the loan becomes performing again
(NOIs are higher than debt service for a certain periods), the loan is sent back to the master
servicer. If the special servicer chooses to foreclose the loan, all advances the special servicer has
made since the transfer event will be reimbursed with interests,
tP
j=1
Zj (1 +R1)
t j , before the
proceeds are distributed to bond holders: In addition, the special servicer receives the liquidation
fee s2Vt , expressed as a percentage of property liquidation value Vt and principal value after it
pays out to other senior bond holders if its principal is not wiped out, max (0; Vt   (1  b)L).
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The property liquidation value can be derived as the last period NOI capitalized at the terminal
cap rate, RT ; i.e. Vt =
NOIt
RT
: Brown, Ciocheti and Riddiough (2006) suggest that depressed
industry conditions will drive a wedge between fundamental asset value and the asset sale price.
Therefore the terminal cap rate is assumed higher than going-in cap rate. In addition, Y (Xt)
captures the disutility (or penalty) a special servicer suer if she has been working with the
distressed loan for a signicant long period. Y (Xt) is modeled as negatively related to the
cumulative advancement Xt: As for the same revenue incentive, longer the distressed loan has
been in the special servicer's house, the bigger the reputational penalty it will incur if she does
not make a successful workout.
The special servicer's utility for a successful workout is specied as follows:
u (xt; i; 1) = s3L+ bLR0 +
tX
j=1
Zj (1 +R1)
t j (3.6)
A loan is sent back to the master servicer when its current NOIt exceeds the stabilized
NOI dened at the origination plus an extra amount, which is modeled increasing function of
the cumulative advances, that is NOIt > NOI0 + kXt:The proceeds a special servicer receives
include a workout fee s3L
5, interest payment bLR0 from the rst-loss bonds she holds and the
reimbursement of total advances made with compounded interests6.
4. The Result
We calibrate our model parameters and estimate any behavior biases as a consequence of the
special servicer's compensation. We particularly focus on investigating the inuence of the
servicer holding the rst loss bond. The data generating process can be regarded as realization
of a controlled Markov process generated from the solution to the innite horizon stochastic
control problem. The estimation in this paper is based on simulations. The parameter values of
base scenario are in table 3, value function is approximated using nested xed point algorithm.
5Under the current industry practice of special servicing, the workout fee is the same as the amount
of fees received if special servicer foreclose the loan.
6Note equation 3.6 does not have error term, because workout is one of the possible results from a
decision of continue the special servicer made.
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Table 3 Parameter Values of Base Scenario
Baseline Scenario Parameter Value
Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV0) 70%
Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR0) 1:4
Capitalization Rate (Annual) (Cap0) 9:0%
Reimbursement Interest Rate (Annual) (R1) 7:0%
Intertemporal Rate of Substitution () 0:992
Stabilized NOI (Monthly) (NOI0) 10:0
Volatility of NOI 3:0
Autoregressive Parameter () 0:70
Portion of First-loss Bond Holding (b) 0:2%  2:0%
Compensations of the Special Servicer
Fixed (Monthly) Special Servicing Fee (s1) 2 bps
Foreclose Fee (s2) 1%
Workout Fee (s3) 1%
The objective of this study is to quantify the size of workout bias in terms of NOI threshold.
The foreclose NOI cut-o point is the result of optimal decision of special servicer based on
current realization of cash ow (NOIt) and cumulative advances made since servicing transfer
event (Xt) :The special servicer is essentially making a optimal stopping (foreclose) decision to
exercise the workout option. The option value of continued workout is the central feature of the
model. By extending the specially serviced loan to next period, the servicer preserves the option
of workout or liquidate the loan later. Holding a portion of the subordination bonds typically
provides him a stronger incentive to postpone foreclosure.
We dene the foreclosure bias as the percentage dierence between foreclose thresholds be-
tween a special servicer who hold rst-loss piece and who does not hold any rst-loss pieces. Let
NOI (NOI) be the foreclosure thresholds for the special servicer who holds (does not hold)
the rst-loss bond. We thus measure the foreclosure bias as the percentage dierence between
NOI and NOI; normalized by initial net operating income NOI07.
Foreclosure Bias =
NOI  NOI
NOI0
(4.1)
7We choose the innitial NOI0 level to normalized the foreclosure bias rather than NOI
; because NOI
itself is a random variable and it can vary dramatically according to state realizations, which makes the
normalized bias unstable.
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4.1. Foreclosure Bias When the Special Servicer Holds First-loss Bonds
Figure 4 demonstrates simulated regions for continuation, foreclosure and workout decisions of
the special servicer. Vertical axis represents the NOI realization state and horizontal axis is state
variable Xt, measured by the number of month after special servicing transfer event. These area
plots can be interpreted as a map of optimal workout strategies resulted from special servicer's
dynamic programming problem. Any point on the map, which gives the special servicer an
optimal workout decision, is a combination of two state variables: 1) current NOI level, and
2) the special servicing severity (cumulative advances made by the special servicer measured in
number of months in special servicing).
The four panels in gure 4 demonstrate four scenarios of dierent optimal workout strategies
according to dierent rst-loss bond holding percentages when the delinquent loan was trans-
ferred to the special servicer. The white region represents the workout region where sucient
NOIs make the loan performing and current. The NOI levels in the workout region reect the
fact that specially serviced loan has been returned to the master servicer. The criteria of success-
ful workout is exogenously specied as NOI returns the stabilized NOI level, which is modeled as
increasing function of special servicing severity to capture the fact that a deeply distressed loan
should achieved a higher NOI before returning to the master servicer. The dark area represents
the foreclosure region where the special servicer's optimal decision is to foreclose the property.
The gray area on the bottom of the graph is the continuation region. The border line between
foreclosure region and continuation region is the foreclosure thresholds (NOI):If the NOI is
lower than the border line, the special servicer will choose to postpone the foreclosure. Because
low net operating income means poor liquidation value, and the option of foreclosure is deeply
out of money.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 4 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
We are interested in how the special servicer's rst-loss holdings bias her foreclosure deci-
sions. It is apparent from gure 4 that continuation region (or number of states in extending
the foreclosures) increases when the rst-loss bond holding increases from no-holding to 0.2%
holdings to 2% holdings. The marginal changes in foreclosing NOI levels reect the discrepancy
in foreclosure decisions for special servicer who holds rst-loss bonds. In order to clearly identify
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the foreclosure bias, gure 5 summarizes the information from gure 4 and shows this foreclosure
bias at various special servicing periods. The optimal foreclosure threshold can be 50% higher
for servicers who hold the rst loss bond than for those who do not hold this bond. The dotted
line represents the case when the servicer holds only 0.2% of rst-loss bonds. The dash line
represents a rst-loss bond holding of 0.5 percent while solid line represents the holding of 2
percent. Figure 5 shows signicant bias ranging from zero to 50 percent. The gap is higher when
the cumulative advances are larger. (More rst-loss bond holding yields higher foreclosure bias.)
Somewhat interesting is that after reaching the peak, the foreclosure bias declines. A prolonged
period of advances correspond to a continually underperforming property not capable of gener-
ating sucient income to make it's debt service payments. As this continues, the foreclosure bias
decreases until the bias is eliminated. This result suggests that although in the early stages of
making advances, the servicer realizes there is the possibility that she can recover such advances
should the loan become performing. However, as more and more of these advances are made,
the likelihood of recovering these advances diminishes and to the point where her foreclosure
decision would be identical to that of a servicer who does not hold a rst-loss bond.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 5 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
4.2. Robust Checks
Our results are robust under various parameter specications. The foreclosure biases are both
statistically and economically signicant under dierent NOI processes, dierent CMBS under-
writing standards (LTV, DSCR, interest rate, etc.). In this section, we test two alternative
explanations: the rst is to test whether the current practices of "delay and pray" or "pre-
tend and extend" are due to a dramatic change in market fundamentals; the second hypothesis
deals with the argument that rst-loss bond held by special servicers have been under water or
deteriorating.
4.2.1. Foreclosure Bias When the Market Fundamentals Change
The record-high numbers of CMBS loan distress are coupled with dramatic changes in nancial
market fundamentals. Can market fundamental changes along explain the systematic biases
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of special servicer's foreclosure decision? How much foreclosure biases are due to changes in
market fundamentals and how much attributable to special servicer's holding of rst-loss bonds?
This section investigates this question by assuming a structural change in market capitalization
rate. In the base model, cap rates are market average rate used to capitalize the stabilized net
operating incomes. The market cap rates are assumed to be under rational expectation and
complete market information. Now let's assume there is a permanent shock to the economy
and market is undergone a structural change on how market value cash ows8. In particular,
we assume the expected average cap rate permanently increases from 9% to 12% after loan
underwriting.
Figure 6 compares the excess delays in foreclosures after cap rate increases under various
rst-loss bond holdings ranging from zero to one percent. The percentage changes in foreclosure
threshold are calculated as the percentage dierence in NOI cuto points, which are similar
to the foreclose biases dened in equation 4.1. The dotted line of zero rst-loss holding in
gure 6 shows that the extended delays are expected to be high for distressed loans that are
newly transferred and loans that have stayed in special servicing for longer periods. For those
loans that are in special servicing for 15 to 28 months, the special servicer tends to foreclosure
sooner. This reects the situation that special servicer does not expect the market condition
improves in the near future and forecloses soon to recover as much as possible. The U-shaped
patterns remain true and more pronounced as the percentage rst-loss holdings increases. To
estimate the overall or cumulative eect of the cap rate change, we measure the likelihood of
continuation region weighted by state probability. Because the distribution of NOI realization is
not uniform (the realization probability of NOI = 9 is much higher than NOI = 3 for example.
However correctly assign NOI probability distribution is non-trivial, as a loan is in a state of 10
month of special servicing is conditional on the fact that it has been with the special servicer
for 9 months. To facilitate faster calibration, we use stationary distribution of AR(1) for NOI
process. Therefore the resulting measure of excess delays in foreclosures under-estimates true
extension bias.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 6 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
8This may be due to changes in people's perception of risk or valuation of risks.
15
Three curves in gure 7 conrm the intuition that under permanent shock in market fun-
damentals, special servicers tend to postpone foreclosure. However this eect produces only a
limited bias of under 0.5% for loans that in special servicing for more than 8 months if special
servicer holds no rst-loss piece. The market fundamental eects play a much more important
role when the special servicer holds rst-loss pieces. If special servicer holds 0:5% and 1% of
rst-loss bonds, the excess delay could be as high as 75% and 30% respectively. We conclude that
it is the rst-loss holding that makes the special servicer makes a more pronounced foreclosure
delays under a permanent change in market fundamentals.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 7 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
4.2.2. Foreclosure Bias When the Special Servicer's First-loss Bond holdings
Decrease
The results from the base model build on the assumption that the shares of rst-loss pieces
that special servicer holds remain constant during the special servicing periods. As the loan
performance deteriorating, the positions in special servicer's rst-loss holding may decrease or
even wipe out entirely. To estimate the impact of such deteriorating eects, we compare the
foreclosure biases with 0.5% initial rst-loss bond holding of constant holding versus that of
diminishing holding. Figure 8 shows the foreclosure bias remains signicant. For the loans
special serviced under 15 months, the biases are the same. It is only until the rst-loss holdings
reduced to almost zero, the foreclose bias stars to narrow.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 8 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
5. Conclusion and Implications to CMBS Contract Design
The conict of interests between senior bond holders and junior bond holders as well as the "self-
dealing" problem of special servicers raise a big question of optimal contract design of CMBS
deals. The historical high level of defaults and the temporary suspension of CMBS insurance
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provide challenges as well as opportunities to optimal contract design. In the discussion above,
we proxy the self-dealing problem of special servicer using the rst-loss bond ownership and
conict of compensation structures. We demonstrates how a special servicer, when she is holding
the rst loss bond from the structure which contains the nonperforming loans she is managing,
can lead to postpone the foreclosure decision. Thus our model provides a formal model of the
present day industry practice of \Delay and Pray", and "Extend and Pretend." We show that
the more subordination bonds she holds, the more she is inclined to postpone the foreclosure
decision. This workout behavior only skews the decision up to a point after which the servicer
reverts back to an unbiased foreclosure rule.
Governed by the pooling and servicing agreement, a special servicer should maximize the
total recovery of all CMBS bond holders on a present value basis. This paper shows that
since most special servicers are also the investors of or appointed by the controlling class (rst-
loss bond investors), their foreclose decision on a specially serviced loan might be biased. Our
dynamic programming model attempts to quantify this bias, which can be as high as 50 percent,
in terms of optimal NOI foreclosing threshold.
Based on the proposed model, the following recommendations9 we could provide for optimal
design of CMBS service contract: (1) Special servicers should not given the rst-refusal option
to purchase defaulted loans or they should buy the defaulted loans in a competitive market;
(2) The re-appointment of special servicer should be made by an independent entity who will
represent the whole trust; (3) Fees paid to the special servicing should be capped or shared by
the trust.
9Some of the recommendations are consistent with the recent CMBS deal - the $788.5 million GS
Mortgage Securities Trust 2010-C1, backed by commercial mortgages contributed by Goldman, Citi and
Starwood Property. In this deal, where Wells Fargo was appointed master and special servicer, a cap was
put on special servier fees for loan workout. The replacement fo special servicer will be dericted by the
a majority vote; no single bond class will have the right to replace the special servicer. In addition, the
deal eliminated the traditional option for the special servicer to buy defaulted loans. Instead, loans have
to be marketed and sold to the highest bidders.
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Figure 1 Maturing CMBS Loan Balance by Issuing Vintage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 CMBS Loans in Special Servicing as of July 31, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Decision Tree of a Typical Special Servicer 
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